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C. SCOTT HEMPHILL

& PHILIP J. WEISER

Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to the Law of
Predatory Pricing
abstract. This Feature offers a roadmap for bringing and deciding predatory pricing cases
under the Supreme Court’s restrictive Brooke Group decision. Brooke Group requires a plaintiff to
show that the defendant set a price below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its
investment in predation. This framework, which was adopted without any contested presentation
of its merits, has endured despite its ﬂaws. Beyond this framework, the Court opined in dicta that
predation is implausible.
We identify points of ﬂexibility within the Court’s framework that permit an empirically
grounded evaluation of the predation claim. Under the price-cost test, a plaintiff has leeway to
select an appropriate measure of cost, including incremental cost. In considering recoupment,
Brooke Group’s skeptical dicta should be conﬁned to the particular market structure and theory of
recoupment analyzed in that case. The dicta do not apply, for example, to a monopolist who recoups by earning a reputation for predation. A further reason to conﬁne Brooke Group’s dicta is the
Court’s highly unusual reweighing of the evidence presented at trial. As we explain using new
historical research, this was not the Court’s initial plan after oral argument, but Justice Kennedy
switched his vote. We also make the case against extending the price-cost test to more complex
pricing strategies, such as loyalty discounts, in which the motivation for a stringent rule—to avoid
costly false positives—has little purchase.
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introduction
Over the past twenty-ﬁve years, antitrust claims alleging a predatory price
cut have fallen into disuse. This can largely be attributed to the Supreme Court’s
1993 decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,1 which
established the current framework for evaluating predatory pricing claims. Under Brooke Group, a plaintiff must show that the alleged predator both set a price
below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its predation-period
losses through post-predation gains. The price-cost and recoupment tests are
difficult to satisfy and were imposed to serve the Court’s stated goal to avoid
condemning—and thereby chilling—procompetitive price cuts. Beyond this
framework, Brooke Group offered the view, expressed in dicta, that predation is
implausible.
In this Feature, we reconsider the application of Brooke Group to modern predation cases and other pricing strategies. As we explain, Brooke Group’s two-part
framework was adopted by the Court without any contested presentation of its
merits, and both parts of the framework are subject to serious criticism.2 The
price-cost test permits the exclusion of higher-cost rivals whose presence would
otherwise place downward pressure on prices. The recoupment test exonerates
some below-cost pricing whose condemnation would have little chilling effect
on procompetitive conduct. Using the tests in tandem can yield inconsistent,
even paradoxical, results. Despite these inﬁrmities, however, the Brooke Group
framework appears to be well entrenched in the Court’s jurisprudence. 3 We
therefore take the framework as given and suggest how best to apply it in practice, recognizing that the Court could revisit this precedent in an appropriate
case.
Our main contribution is to articulate the elements of a successful predation
claim and explain how courts should operate within the strictures of Brooke
Group. For example, suppose that an airline has monopoly power on a route between its hub and another major city. In response to new entry by a low-cost
carrier (LCC), the incumbent drops its price and increases capacity on the route.
The LCC gives up and exits the market, whereupon the incumbent returns to its
previous price and quantity. Other entrants are thereby discouraged from challenging the incumbent on this and other routes.
How should a court approach these facts? Using recent airline predation
cases to illustrate our argument, we identify three elements of ﬂexibility within

1.
2.
3.

509 U.S. 209 (1993).
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.A (describing the Supreme Court’s use of the Brooke Group framework in
later cases).
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the Brooke Group framework that, taken together, enable a court to conduct an
empirically grounded evaluation of the predation claim. First, where the evidence shows recoupment by a monopolist, Brooke Group’s skepticism does not
apply. Brooke Group dealt with alleged recoupment by an oligopoly, with no conspiracy among its members to facilitate the scheme, a market structure that (in
the Court’s view) made successful predation particularly unlikely. Monopolies
are different. Second, a plaintiff is free, even under Brooke Group, to show that
the defendant successfully recouped by acquiring a reputation for predation in
other markets. The Brooke Group Court had no opportunity to consider reputation or any of the other modern economic theories under which recoupment is a
rational strategy. Third, for purposes of the price-cost test, the plaintiff has leeway to select an appropriate measure of cost. Brooke Group itself used average
variable cost, but anticipated the use of other measures, such as incremental
cost.4
The Court’s unusually detailed review of particular case facts in Brooke Group
provides a further reason to conﬁne Brooke Group’s dicta that predation is implausible. As we explain using new historical research, the Court did not initially
plan to provide such a detailed review of the case. The Justices initially voted to
reverse the court of appeals, but Justice Kennedy switched his vote. His ﬁnal
opinion for the Court, affirming the judgment of the court below, relied on an
unusual, fact-bound reassessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court’s
extensive review afforded numerous opportunities to express skepticism about
the particular predatory strategy at issue in the case. Where real-world predation
cases differ from the facts and theories that the Court considered in detail, the
Court’s skeptical dicta from Brooke Group should not apply.
Our secondary contribution is to caution against extending the Brooke Group
framework into other areas of antitrust law. Using loyalty discounts as an example, we argue against the extension of Brooke Group to pricing strategies that are
more complex than the relatively simple price cutting at issue in predatory pricing cases. Defendants and some commentators have argued that the Brooke
Group framework, particularly the price-cost test, should be applied to such
strategies. We disagree. In our view, the premises used to justify that test for
simple price cutting do not apply to more complex strategies.
This Feature proceeds in three Parts. Part I presents and criticizes the Brooke
Group framework, placing the Court’s dicta within the context of the unusual,
fact-bound case from which it emerged. Using airline predation as an example,
Part II identiﬁes points of ﬂexibility when applying the recoupment and price-

4.

Measures of incremental revenue may also be employed, subject to limitations discussed in
Section II.C.

2050

bringing reality to the law of predatory pricing

cost tests. Part III explains why the price-cost test should not be extended to the
analysis of loyalty discounts.
i. the doctrine and dicta of brooke group
This Part assesses the doctrine and dicta developed in Brooke Group. Section
I.A provides a critical review of the two legal tests adopted by the Court. Section
I.B describes the Court’s skeptical—and highly fact-bound—dicta.
A. The Brooke Group Framework
The Court’s opinion in Brooke Group set out, for the ﬁrst time, two essential
requirements that a plaintiff must establish for a successful claim of predatory
pricing. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant set a price below its
cost.5 The Court required an “appropriate” measure of cost, but left open which
measure should be used.6 Second, a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of recoupment: a “reasonable prospect” or “dangerous probability”7 that the defendant will “recoup[] its investment in below-cost prices.”8 Plaintiffs can establish
recoupment by showing either an ex ante likelihood of recoupment, or that recoupment was achieved in fact.9 The price-cost and recoupment tests may be
considered in either order.

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. Previous cases had reserved “as a formal matter” whether abovecost prices could count. Id.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 224. “Reasonable prospect” is the standard for a nonconspiratorial oligopoly challenged
under the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). “Dangerous probability” is the
standard for predatory pricing by a monopolist under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2012). Brooke Group analyzed a nonconspiratorial oligopoly while concluding that the
fundamental test is the same under either standard.
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224; see also Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term
and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 384 n.303 (1994) (“Until
Brooke Group, recoupment as a separate element of the offense was exceptional.”). Matsushita
Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. had discussed recoupment too, but not as a general prerequisite to recovery. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 232-33 (describing ex ante and ex post recoupment); id. at 238 (concluding that plaintiff had failed to show recoupment in either form).
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1. Price-Cost Test
Prior to Brooke Group, economists urged an approach to predatory pricing
that minimized error costs.10 The application of any legal rule risks two types of
error. In the antitrust context, the condemnation of procompetitive behavior is
termed a “false positive.” Permitting anticompetitive behavior is called a “false
negative.” The error costs of a substantive antitrust rule depend upon the harm
and frequency of false positives and false negatives, including distortion in the
conduct of ﬁrms in response to the rule. Determining the error costs of a particular rule is a complex task and requires a good understanding of the relevant
inputs. In the case of predatory pricing, such a judgment depends in part on the
frequency of procompetitive and anticompetitive price cuts, and the beneﬁts and
harms that arise from each.11
The Court’s price-cost test reﬂects the avoidance of one type of error costs:
false positives. The Court explained that price cuts are generally desirable—the
“mechanism by which a ﬁrm stimulates competition” and “the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect.”12 As the Court saw it, a price cut—at least
as long as the price remains above cost—is unambiguously desirable because it
increases output, thereby raising total and consumer welfare. A false condemnation of an innocent price cut is thus costly because it “chills” desirable price
cuts.13 That is, the major problem is not the erroneous result in the case at hand,
but rather the potential for the false condemnation to discourage other price cuts.
The Court’s approach accepts some false negatives—anticompetitive abovecost price cuts—in order to avoid the chilling effect of false positives.14 Such a
lenient rule, however, can be costly. An important source of false negatives is
above-cost price cuts that exclude a higher cost rival whose presence otherwise
would have constrained the dominant ﬁrm’s prices. Moreover, some excluded
entrants would have become more efficient if enabled to grow, gain scale, and
10.

An early, inﬂuential example is Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
11. For a discussion of error costs in antitrust law, see Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After
Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 591-93 (1994). As Baker also
discusses in later work, the Chicago School project heavily emphasizes false positives and
downplays the importance of false negatives. Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error
Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2015).
12. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104,
122 n.17 (1986)).
13. Id. (“[M]istaken inferences . . . are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect.” (quoting Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 n.17)); see also id.
(“[T]he costs of an erroneous ﬁnding of liability are high.”).
14. See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 952 (2002) (discussing the tradeoff between the costs of underinclusion and overinclusion).
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learn by doing. A further cost of a lenient rule is that other ﬁrms that might be
deterred from entering after they observe aggressive price cuts aimed at excluding earlier entrants. In short, the long-run welfare costs of exclusion from predatory price cutting could be much greater than the short-run beneﬁts of lower
prices.
Brooke Group did not deny that its test is underinclusive,15 but defended its
rule on the ground that a more aggressive test that extended liability to abovecost price cuts was “beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control
without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.” 16 The
Court further asserted in dicta that false negatives would be rare, quoting its
statements in earlier cases that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and
even more rarely successful.”17
As discussed below, this famous dictum about predatory pricing was offered
without adequate empirical support.18 Indeed, it relied on a selective evaluation
of the academic literature, including John McGee’s controversial 1958 article concluding that Standard Oil had not engaged in predation.19 It was also immaterial
to the case at hand. In the ﬁrst place, the Court seems to have meant the term
“predatory pricing” to encompass only below-cost pricing; even if that were rare,
it would tell us little about whether ﬁrms engage in successful schemes to exclude
rivals by price cutting that does not entail below-cost prices. More important,
the Court plainly believed that it was clear from earlier case law that below-cost
pricing could be illegal,20 and was presumably therefore deterred by existing law.
Nonetheless, it held that defendants needed the additional recoupment arrow in
their quiver in order to minimize the chilling effect of false positives.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

The Court exonerated the “exclusionary effect” of above-cost price cuts on two distinct
grounds: either (1) because they were directed at a higher-cost competitor and hence (the
Court thought) “competition on the merits,” or (2) because such price cuts are “beyond the
practical ability” of courts to distinguish. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. The Court apparently
recognized that above-cost price cuts can sometimes exclude lower-cost competitors; otherwise, the second reason would be unnecessary.
Id.
Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986)).
See infra Section I.B.3.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589-90 (citing John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard
Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137, 157 (1958)); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the
Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (2012) (rebutting McGee’s conclusion
that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing).
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-23 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104,
117 (1986), and Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.8, among other cases).
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2. Recoupment Test
The Brooke Group Court’s analysis of error costs contained an important gap.
The Court defended the price-cost test by reference to error costs, but did not
analyze the recoupment test with similar care.21 To see why this is problematic,
consider that the recoupment test has bite in a subset of cases the Court refers to
as “unsuccessful predation.” 22 This refers to cases where the defendant sets a
price below cost, but (1) was unlikely ex ante to recoup enough proﬁt to make
the strategy proﬁtable overall; and (2) failed in fact to recoup such proﬁts ex
post.
The Court concluded that unsuccessful predation is harmless because the
low prices beneﬁt consumers (“a boon to consumers”23), and hence, condemning unsuccessful predation is a further form of false positive.24 The conclusion
that unsuccessful predation is harmless is not quite right, because below-cost
prices are distortive even when they do not exclude, a point the Court quietly
acknowledged in part. 25 But more importantly, the Court failed to address
whether (and on what theory) condemning unsuccessful predation would chill
desirable price cuts. After all, punishing the typical case of unsuccessful predation—below-cost pricing by a would-be predator who is irrational or mistaken
about the proﬁtability of the scheme—is not likely to chill price competition
when proﬁtability does not depend on recoupment.26

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

The ﬁnal paragraph of Part II.A of the Court’s opinion discusses error costs and contains several of the quotations discussed above. The paragraph immediately follows a discussion of
recoupment but pertains to the overall approach, not the recoupment test in particular. It begins, “[t]hese prerequisites to recovery are not easy to establish,” and the “prerequisites” are
the price-cost and recoupment tests. Id. at 226.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. (“Without [recoupment], predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices . . . , and
consumer welfare is enhanced.”).
Id. (acknowledging “inefficient substitution”).
See Louis Kaplow, Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST L.J.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 38), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty
/searlecenter/events/antitrust/documents/Kaplow_MPRecoup6.417.pdf [http://perma.cc
/V93F-JLCX].
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3. Interaction of the Tests
The Brooke Group framework sets up a tension between the price-cost and
recoupment tests.27 A price below cost is, in effect, prima facie evidence that the
ﬁrm thought it could recoup its predatory price cut. That action suggests, at a
minimum, that the ﬁrm believed that recoupment was likely. After all, to set such
a price and not expect to recoup later proﬁts on account of predation is inconsistent with rational proﬁt-maximizing behavior. Thus, where the recoupment
requirement affects the outcome of a case, that result is either a false negative or
else an instance where the would-be predator is irrational or mistaken, whether
due to a miscalculation or becoming the unlucky “victim” of changed market
conditions.28
The recoupment test makes most sense, not as an additional substantive requirement for anticompetitive predation, but as a hedge against an erroneous
factual determination of below-cost pricing.29 The idea is that, to guard against
a false positive from a mistaken application of the price-cost test, courts should
also require proof that recoupment was likely because, if it were not likely, the
defendant would not have deliberately sold at a price below cost.
But if that is the rationale, the two tests should be viewed as factors informing a single overall analysis, rather than as sharply distinct inquiries. 30 The
Brooke Group decision would be less problematic if it explicitly allowed recoupment evidence to inform the price-cost inquiry, and vice versa. Even as written,
the Brooke Group framework does not preclude this approach. Consider, for example, a case where there is clear documentary evidence of pricing below cost.
In such a case, it is reasonable to conclude that the defendant had an ex ante

27.

Even “[i]f circumstances indicate that below-cost pricing could likely produce its intended
effect on the target,” such harm to a competitor is not enough. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225.
“[T]here is still the further question whether it would likely injure competition in the relevant
market.” Id.; see also id. at 224 (noting that harm to rivals from below-cost pricing “is of no
moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured”).
28. There are also circumstances where a naïve application of the price-cost test might yield a
potential false positive—for example, when a ﬁrm introduces a product with temporary low
prices, or sets a low price in anticipation of later scale economies. But such potential false
positives are not solved by the recoupment test, because presumably such strategies will be
proﬁtable in the later period. Put the other way, a ﬁnding of no recoupment casts doubt on
both the predation explanation and the competing “later scale economies” story, rather than
cleanly distinguishing between them. Kaplow, supra note 26, provides an extensive discussion
of the test’s inability to distinguish between competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.
29. This approach works best if the court is equipped with a robust understanding of the full
range of modern recoupment theories.
30. See Kaplow, supra note 26 (manuscript at 13-17) (discussing triangulation).
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expectation, and thus likelihood, of recoupment. A court applying the Brooke
Group framework should conclude that such evidence outweighs equivocal expert evidence about whether the industry’s market structure supports recoupment.31
A pragmatic approach to the Brooke Group framework suggests a ﬂexible application of both tests. Under this approach, the sharper the price cut and the
larger the proﬁt sacriﬁce, the stronger the indication that the defendant expected
ex ante to recoup. 32 On the other hand, clear evidence about recoupment
(whether positive or negative) should outweigh equivocal evidence about prices.
This approach shares a kinship to cases that treat proﬁt sacriﬁce as an indication
of market power.33 And indeed, the analysis of recoupment closely resembles the
analysis of market power, which is already an explicit requirement in predatory
pricing cases decided under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
4. Adoption Without Analysis
The limits of the Brooke Group framework reﬂect the unique manner in
which the Court decided the case. Notably, because of how the parties argued
the case, the Court accepted the price-cost and recoupment tests with little analysis. During oral argument, the plaintiff conceded that it had the burden to show
both below-cost prices and a likelihood of recoupment.34 Without any contested

31.

Brooke Group does place one limit on this approach. If the only evidence of recoupment comes
from below-cost pricing, that is not enough. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (“Evidence of
below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of probable recoupment and
injury to competition.”).
32. We thus reject the suggestion that a steep price cut reduces the likelihood of predation because
it makes recoupment more difficult to accomplish. That approach gets things backwards, as
explained in C. Scott Hemphill, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1581, 1592-93 (2001).
33. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (noting that “the ‘size
of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong
indicator of power’”) (quoting 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 2046, at 351 (3d ed. 2012)).
34. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *5, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (No. 92-466), 1993 WL 754943 (“We accept the burden of showing that prices were discriminatory, below average variable cost, and were undertaken with a
reasonable prospect of recoupment.”). As Stephen Calkins notes, discussing the academic
work of Philip Areeda, plaintiff ’s counsel, “[i]t would have been awkward for Areeda to have
done otherwise, since his writings seemed to support a recoupment requirement.” Calkins,
supra note 8, at 384 n.304. Areeda was even more closely associated with a price-cost test. See
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699-700 (1975).
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presentation of the two tests, the Court had no real opportunity to assess their
merits.
The effect of this deprivation is visible in the internal analysis of the Court.35
The papers of Justice Blackmun, a Brooke Group dissenter, contain several memoranda written by the Justice’s clerk assigned to the case. One memo analyzed
Justice Kennedy’s draft opinion for the Court and identiﬁed its main holding
(“the only actual law made”) as the adoption of the price-cost and recoupment
tests.36 The clerk noted by way of explanation that both parties had “agreed upon
these requirements, and I did not understand any of the Justices to ﬁnd either of
them objectionable.”37 This perspective, to the extent it might have been shared
more broadly by the Justices, is very surprising, since the Court was announcing
important new rules without any contested presentation of their merits. Moreover, the Court relied on Matsushita’s dated and selective review of the academic
literature to justify its test and its imprudent (and now famous) dictum about
the rarity of predatory pricing.38 In light of this history, and the limits of the test,
courts should be leery of extending this test without careful consideration.
The clerk’s further conclusion that the decision was “very narrow” rested in
part on the assumption that the holding was limited to the type of predation
claim at issue: predation by an oligopoly without any conspiracy among its
members to facilitate the scheme, and pursued not under the Sherman Act but
under a different antitrust statute, the Robinson-Patman Act.39 Several courts of
appeals subsequently reached the same conclusion that Brooke Group does not

35.

36.

37.
38.
39.

Cf. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in the O’Connor-Rehnquist Era: A View from Inside the Supreme
Court, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 21 (using papers of Justice Blackmun and other Justices
to examine several other antitrust cases).
Memorandum from Sherry Colb to Justice Blackmun 1 (May 28, 1993) (on ﬁle with the Library of Congress) (“I have read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in the case, from which you, Justice White and Justice Stevens voted to dissent at Conference . . . . The grounds of the decision
here are very narrow. The only actual law made by this decision is the provision of two requirements to prove a Robinson-Patman Act predatory price discrimination claim: (1) belowcost pricing, and (2) a reasonable prospect of recoupment. Both pet[itione]r and resp[ondent] agreed upon these requirements, and I did not understand any of the Justices to ﬁnd
either of them objectionable.”).
Id.
See infra Section I.B.3.
See supra note 7.
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apply to the Sherman Act or monopolists.40 Later Supreme Court cases, however, came to a different conclusion.41 In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., the Court held that the framework applies to the evaluation of
predatory bidding under the Sherman Act.42 And in Paciﬁc Bell Telephone Co. v.
linkLine Communications, Inc., the Court embraced Brooke Group’s price-cost test
in the analysis of price squeezes.43
The Brooke Group framework appears to be well entrenched, notwithstanding its inﬁrmities and its adoption without any contestation of its merits. But the
tests are not set in stone. In antitrust cases, the modern Court openly embraces
new economic thinking as a basis for changing its mind. To that end, it recently
declared that, in the antitrust ﬁeld, the Court has “felt relatively free to revise
[its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”44 For
purposes of this Feature, we take as given the Brooke Group framework, but recognize that the Court could revisit this precedent in an appropriate case.
B. Dicta
The Court’s dicta in Brooke Group—the “music” of the opinion—reﬂects a
deeply skeptical attitude toward predatory pricing claims. The Court commented on the “general implausibility of predatory pricing,”45 suggesting that
“predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful” 46 and concluding that “the costs of an erroneous ﬁnding of liability are

40.

41.

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

See, e.g., LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (suggesting that
“nothing in the decision suggests” that the Brooke Group decision is “applicable to a monopolist”); see also Spirit Airlines v. Nw. Airlines, 431 F.3d 917, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that even if defendant priced above cost, plaintiff could pursue a section 2 theory notwithstanding Brooke Group).
See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 274 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting later Supreme Court cases as a basis for disregarding the suggestion in LePage’s that Brooke Group does
not apply broadly).
549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007).
555 U.S. 438, 448-55 (2009).
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412-13 (2015); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (switching from per se liability to the rule of reason for maximum resale
price maintenance while noting that “this Court has reconsidered its decisions construing the
Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious
question”).
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986)).
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high.”47 The basis for the Court’s unfriendly dicta was contingent upon the particular market structure at issue, the Court’s highly unusual review of the evidence, and its reliance on a selective reading of the academic literature. Together,
these limitations suggest that Brooke Group’s skeptical dicta should be conﬁned
to the factual context of that case.
1. Oligopoly Recoupment
An important source of the Court’s inhospitality towards predatory pricing
cases is the unusual facts presented in Brooke Group. Because the cigarette makers
were an oligopoly and were not alleged to have been acting in concert, recoupment by supracompetitive pricing was thought to be less likely than if the defendant were a single, monopoly cigarette maker. Oligopoly recoupment would
have required sharing gains among multiple ﬁrms, which would have led to a
much smaller payoff to the ﬁrm accused of below-cost pricing compared to a
situation where the ﬁrm was a monopoly. Further, the required oligopoly coordination itself would have been a daunting challenge. As the Court put it: “This
anticompetitive minuet is most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a
disciplined oligopoly.”48
The Court’s conclusion on this point is doubtful. As Justice Stevens’s dissent
pointed out, the manufacturers had a long history of “supracompetitive, parallel
pricing,” including “lockstep” price increases twice a year.49 This history made
successful coordination more likely: “I would suppose, however, that the professional performers who had danced the minuet for 40 to 50 years would be better
able to predict whether their favorite partners would follow them in the future
than would an outsider, who might not know the difference between Haydn and
Mozart.”50 Whatever the merits of the Court’s analysis, the important point is
that the Court’s dicta was written in a particularized factual setting in which successful predation was thought to be particularly unlikely.51

47.

Id.
Id. at 228. Further, just one member of the cigarette oligopoly committed the unlawful conduct, and its strategy was meant to discipline the victim, rather than exclude it.
49. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 257. This quotation adds a further critique of the Court—that the Court wrongly believed
that its own independent analysis of coordination was more accurate than the evidence of
below-cost pricing, which itself suggested the likelihood of recoupment.
51. A further limitation of the Court’s analysis is that disciplining a single member of an oligopoly
is often easy and effective.
48.
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2. Unusual Review of the Evidence
The importance of the particular facts is reﬂected in the Court’s unusually
deep dive into the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals had affirmed
a judgment for defendants, notwithstanding a jury verdict for plaintiffs, holding
that one of the unusual facts described above—recoupment by an oligopoly—
made recoupment too implausible to support liability as a matter of law.52 The
Supreme Court rejected that extreme view.
The Court might have stopped there, reversing and remanding for further
proceedings. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s notes from Conference indicate that ﬁve
Justices had initially supported this disposition: the three Justices (Stevens,
White, and Blackmun) who ultimately dissented, plus Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy.53 The remaining four Justices had voted to affirm. Had the
Court issued a narrow reversal in accordance with this initial vote, there would
be no occasion for fact-bound skepticism about successful recoupment.
In what would have been an equally benign holding, an overlapping coalition
of ﬁve Justices expressed interest in dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, on the ground that no issue of law was truly presented by the
case.54 This position contrasts sharply with the ultimate result of the case, which
made new law by requiring the price-cost and recoupment tests. Had the Court
taken this path and simply dismissed the writ of certiorari, the effect would be
similar to affirmance (as far as the parties were concerned). But then there would
be no Brooke Group opinion at all; the lower court’s judgment for defendants
would be the ﬁnal word. Five Justices, all of whom ultimately joined the opinion
of the Court, favored this approach: Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter,
plus—once again—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Justice Stevens
circulated a memo to the Justices the day after Conference, arguing that plaintiff
(the petitioner) did not agree that no legal issue was presented by the case, and
hence dismissal was not an appropriate result.55 Ultimately, the dismissal idea
was dropped, though in helping to defeat it, Justice Stevens may have opened a
path to affirmance despite his own preference for reversal.

52.

Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“To rely on the characteristics of an oligopoly to assure recoupment of losses from a predatory
pricing scheme after one oligopolist has made a competitive move is . . . economically irrational.”).
53. Notes from Conference (Mar. 31, 1993) (on ﬁle with the Library of Congress). The votes to
reverse and remand or vacate and remand are indicated in Justice Blackmun’s notes by “RR,”
“VR,” or simply “–.”
54. Id. (noting that ﬁve Justices indicated an inclination to “DIG”).
55. Memorandum to the Conference (Apr. 1, 1993).

2060

bringing reality to the law of predatory pricing

Justice Blackmun’s clerk, in a memo evaluating whether the Court should
dismiss the writ, worried that Justice Kennedy might change his vote from reverse to affirm.56 The next day, the Justices voted again. Both Justice Kennedy
and the Chief Justice switched their votes to affirm, making the vote 6-3 to afﬁrm.57
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, affirming the judgment below, relied upon an extensive and highly unusual review of the record.58 The opinion
ultimately concluded that the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, could not support recoupment. Justice Stevens, forced into dissent,
criticized this approach as unwise and unjustiﬁed, and noted that the majority
imposed an improper burden of proof of the plaintiff.59 The Court’s extensive
review afforded numerous opportunities to express skepticism about the particular predatory strategy at issue in the case.60 As a result, the Court’s skepticism
about liability is rooted, in part, in the details of its unusually deep, particularized inquiry.
3. Selective Reliance on Literature About Recoupment
A ﬁnal source of Brooke Group’s inhospitality to predatory pricing claims was
the Chicago School perspective about the low likelihood of successful predation.
For example, consider the Court’s famous statement that predation is “rarely

56.

57.

58.
59.
60.

Memorandum from Sherry Kolb to Justice Blackmun 1 (Mar. 31, 1993) (on ﬁle with the Library of Congress) (“I am not conﬁdent about the result. Five Justices voted the right way
(i.e., to reverse and remand). However, when Justice Kennedy voted to reverse, he also said
that he was ‘close to Nino.’ Since Justice Scalia’s vote was to affirm, and he said that the bar
would be ‘shocked’ if the Court reversed, I worry that Justice Kennedy’s vote may change.”).
These comments by Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia are reﬂected in (and likely based on)
Justice Blackmun’s Conference notes. See Notes from Conference, supra note 53. The Conference notes suggest that Justice Kennedy expressed interest in the full range of outcomes: reversal, dismissal, or affirmance.
See Notes from Conference, supra note 53 (additional annotation recording vote on April 2,
1993, with 6-3 to affirm); Docket, No. 92-466, available in Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal &
Harold J. Spaeth, The Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, WASH. U. ST.
LOUIS (2007), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunDockets/1992/Paid/docket-92
-466.pdf [http://perma.cc/6G73-4MC4] (noting, in blue pencil, the results of revote taken
on April 2, 1993). The docket sheet suggests that the Chief Justice’s preference at the second
vote was dismissal as a ﬁrst choice, affirmance as a second choice.
The Court’s opinion acknowledged the unusual nature of this inquiry. Brooke Group, 509 U.S.
at 230 (“It is not customary for this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . .”).
Id. at 244, 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 230-31 (noting the “complex chain of cause and effect” at issue); id. at 238 (concluding that plaintiff failed to provide evidence of actual or likely supracompetitive pricing).
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tried, and even more rarely successful.”61 This stark view was not the result of
the Court’s own analysis, but rather a partial quotation of the Court’s 1986 opinion in Matsushita. Matsushita, which dealt with oligopoly (like Brooke Group),
attributed this conclusion to a “consensus among commentators.”62 Matsushita
based its assertion of consensus on works by Chicago School scholars Robert
Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and John McGee, from the early 1980s or before, that
emphasized the uncertainties of recoupment, including the possibilities that the
predation would not exclude rivals and that new entry would prevent proﬁt-taking.63 The Court selectively relied on this literature, which was contested at the
time and which later work has undermined.64 Consequently, the kind of skepticism reﬂected in Brooke Group is inapt when a plaintiff relies on modern economic learning not presented to or relied on by the Court.
ii. applying brooke group
Some observers worry that, after Brooke Group, a meritorious predation case
is almost impossible to win. While it is true that no predatory pricing case (as
far as we know) has been litigated to a ﬁnal judgment for plaintiffs,65 this is not

61.
62.
63.

64.

65.

Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986)).
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589 (“[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory
pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”).
Id. at 589-90 (citing, inter alia, ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 145 (1978); Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON.
289, 295-97 (1980); McGee, supra note 19, at 157).
See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000) (offering theoretical and empirical support
for predation as a rational strategy).
This is true as of November 2017. For an earlier assessment of the case law, see Edlin, supra
note 14, at 941 (reaching the same conclusion as of 2002). See also Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox
of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 n.58 (2005) (reporting favorable plaintiff ’s verdict and subsequent settlement in a case decided under Texas law).
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too revealing, as very few antitrust cases reach a ﬁnal judgment. Numerous predatory pricing cases have survived summary judgment,66 while others have survived dismissal.67 It is likely that still other cases have settled favorably without
ever leaving a notable opinion.68
This is not to say that winning a predation case, even with strong facts, is
easy. Far from it. Our claim is only that predation cases are not hopeless, and our
project is to provide guidance to litigants and courts about the right approach.
Thus, in this Part, we consider how courts (and parties) can and should adapt
Brooke Group to the facts of real-world predation cases. Courts can accept the
framework—both the price-cost test and the recoupment test—without accepting dicta that does not apply to the factual setting of their particular cases. Indeed, Brooke Group itself invites adaptation as to both tests.
As noted in the Introduction, we identify three points of ﬂexibility regarding
Brooke Group. Section II.A explains that where the evidence pertains to recoupment by a monopolist, the conditions of recoupment are more favorable than
those in Brooke Group, and the Court’s skepticism should not apply. The same is
true of an oligopoly whose members, unlike the cigarette manufacturers in
Brooke Group, enter a predatory pricing conspiracy. Section II.B argues that,
where the recoupment strategy is different from the strategy Brooke Group considered, the court should maintain an open mind. In particular, a plaintiff is free
to allege recoupment under any of the modern economic theories of predation,
such as the establishment of a reputation for predation. Section II.C describes

66.

E.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); Multistate Legal
Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir.
1995); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1994);
Cont’l Airlines v. Am. Airlines, 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993). In Continental Airlines,
plaintiffs’ predation claim was tried to verdict in August 1993, a few months after Brooke Group
was decided. See Jury Verdict for American Airlines, AMR Corp., Cont’l Airlines v. Am. Airlines, 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (No. 3:92-CV-00259).
67. E.g., Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Products Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 350, 352 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiff properly pled below-cost pricing in its bids for government contracts); Aventura Cable Corp. v. Rifkin/Narragansett S. Fla. CATV Ltd. P’ship, 941 F. Supp.
1189 (S.D. Fla. 1996); see also Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1051–
52 (11th Cir. 2004) (denying dismissal as to price squeeze allegations evaluated under Brooke
Group). We omit cases where the predation allegations were perfunctory or idiosyncratic.
68. The list is longer if discounting and bundling cases are included. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts,
Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725-26 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (describing jury
verdict in favor of plaintiff in a bundling case); Company News; Brunswick To Settle Pricing
Suits for $65 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/23/business/company-news-brunswick-to-settle-pricing-suits-for-65-million.html
[http://
perma.cc/9RE6-7E8Y] (describing settlement in a probable discounting case); see also Crane,
supra note 65, at 15-16 (discussing both cases).
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the leeway that a plaintiff has, for purposes of the price-cost test, in selecting an
appropriate measure of cost and revenue.
Although the analysis has general applicability, we illustrate our points in the
context of a particular industry: airlines. The airline industry represents a useful
example, given Alfred Kahn’s opinion that, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s
view, airline predation was neither “rarely attempted” nor “rarely successful,”69
the Department of Transportation’s conclusion that incumbent airlines predated
in response to LCC entry in the 1990s,70 and a pair of major predation cases—
United States v. AMR Corp.71 and Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.72—
which resulted in appellate opinions at summary judgment.73
A. Monopoly Recoupment
The Brooke Group opinion invites a ﬂexible, context-speciﬁc approach to recoupment. For example, the Court prescribes “a close analysis of both the scheme
alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market.”74
As for market structure and conditions, recoupment is unlikely “[i]n certain situations,” but not all.75 Recoupment is unlikely, and hence “summary disposition . . . is appropriate,” “where the market is highly diffuse and competitive, or
where new entry is easy, or the defendant lacks” the ability to absorb the rival’s
sales.76 And at least one precondition for recoupment—whether a price cut is capable of causing exit or altering behavior—depends on a variety of factors.77 The
69.

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Alfred E. Kahn, Alfred Kahn on Predation at Air Hubs: An AAI Column, AM. ANTITRUST INST.
(Dec. 7, 1999), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/alfred-kahn-predation-air-hubs
-aai-column [http://perma.cc/4EVU-KEBX] (“There are in fact strong reasons to believe
that, at least so far as the airlines business is concerned, the Supreme Court’s view . . . is
simply incorrect.”).
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPETITION IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY:
THE NEED FOR A POLICY TO PREVENT UNFAIR PRACTICES: REVISED 8 (1998); see also id. (attachment describing four examples in detail); Chris Sagers, “Rarely Tried, and . . . Rarely Successful”: Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among the Airlines, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 919, 92425 (2009) (collecting sources noting presence of airline predation).
335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).
Airline predation cases are enormously complicated, and we are not attempting a comprehensive review.
Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225 (enumerating as factors “the extent and duration of the alleged predation, the relative
ﬁnancial strength of the predator and its intended victim, and their respective incentives and
will”).
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Court thus recognized that the result of the recoupment analysis varies from case
to case.
One source of ﬂexibility arises where a monopoly, rather than oligopoly, is
concerned. If recoupment is undertaken by a monopoly protected by high barriers to entry, we are far from the oligopoly considered in Brooke Group. Airlines
offer a suitable example. Although the airline industry is commonly described as
oligopolistic, particular routes are sometimes dominated by individual ﬁrms,
particularly at an incumbent airline’s hub.
For example, in Spirit Airlines, the Sixth Circuit considered alleged predation
by Northwest Airlines at its Detroit hub.78 Spirit, an LCC, introduced nonstop
service from Detroit to Philadelphia and Boston. In response to low-price competition from the LCC, Northwest matched the fares on both routes and added
capacity.79 Spirit presented evidence of a high Northwest market share on both
routes (72% and 89% prior to entry, respectively) and signiﬁcant barriers to entry, including brand loyalty and control of scarce gates. 80 The district court
granted summary judgment to Northwest. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial.81 In doing so, the court recognized a “corollary” to
Brooke Group’s statement about market structure: “where the market is highly
concentrated, the barriers to entry are high, the defendant has market power and
excess capacity, and evidence of actual recoupment is present, summary judgment is inappropriate.”82 The Sixth Circuit’s analysis ultimately rested not only
on evidence about structure, but also upon evidence of actual recoupment by
Northwest from fewer ﬂights and higher prices once Spirit exited the market.83
We are also skeptical that Brooke Group addresses how to approach tacit coordination by a stable oligopoly. In Brooke Group, the Court painted the cigarette

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 924.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 953. The trial never happened because Northwest Airlines went bankrupt for unrelated
reasons. See U.S. Airlines File for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/business/worldbusiness/us-airlines-ﬁle-for-bankruptcy
-protection.html [http://perma.cc/WS6Q-C94A].
Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 931.
Id. at 951 (noting the incongruity that, after Spirit exited the Detroit-Philadelphia market,
Northwest “dropped ﬂights notwithstanding the increased customer demand of ‘price-sensitive travelers’ for those routes”).
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business as highly dynamic, with price competition apt to break out at any moment.84 In other cases, where the stability of oligopoly is supported by high levels of concentration, substantial proﬁts, and a low likelihood of entry, the use of
predatory pricing to deter entry should be a cause for concern. Indeed, as this
market structure has become the norm in important industries, this scenario is
hardly a hypothetical concern. As a recent Goldman Sachs report explained, touting the proﬁtability of such industries:
There is a natural pull toward consolidation among mature or maturing
industries. An oligopolistic market structure can turn a cut-throat commodity industry into a highly proﬁtable one. Oligopolistic markets are
powerful because they simultaneously satisfy multiple critical components of sustainable competitive advantage—a smaller set of relevant
peers faces lower competitive intensity, greater stickiness and pricing
power with customers due to reduced choice, scale cost beneﬁts including stronger leverage over suppliers, and higher barriers to new entrants
all at once.85
The report emphasized a number of industries as potentially fulﬁlling its
“dreams of oligopoly,” including airlines, beer, and wireless telephony.86
Although Brooke Group expressed skepticism about oligopoly recoupment,
the Court recognized that it all depends on the facts: “However unlikely [oligopoly recoupment] may be as a general matter, when the realities of the market and
the record facts indicate that it has occurred and was likely to have succeeded,
theory will not stand in the way of liability.” 87 As discussed in Part I, an important reason the Court rejected oligopoly recoupment was the difficulty of coordination, particularly without any allegation of conspiracy. 88 Regardless of

84.

85.

86.

87.
88.

See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 238 (1993). For
a contrary view of the facts, see Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1736-37 (2013).
See Robert D. Boroujerdi et al., Does Consolidation Create Value?, GOLDMAN SACHS 3 (Feb. 12,
2014), http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3124001/Goldman-merger-analysis.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KA5E-2234].
Id. at 8-20. There is interdependence between optimal merger control and predation liability.
Merger policy must be particularly vigilant to the extent that an industry, once concentrated,
is beyond regulation. If predation liability is deliberately underinclusive, then that places additional pressure on merger control. Viewed from the other side, if lenient merger review permits increased concentration, the optimal predatory pricing rule is more aggressive.
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 229 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 466-67 (1992)).
See supra Section I.B.1.
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whether coordination by cigarette makers in the 1980s was feasible, other oligopolies will sometimes be able to coordinate their predatory conduct and recoupment, even without a provable agreement.89
B. Modern Economic Theory of Recoupment
Brooke Group also should not determine the result when a plaintiff offers a
modern economic theory of recoupment. In Brooke Group, the Court concluded
that a particular strategy of oligopoly recoupment could not be supported by the
facts of that case. But over the past forty years, economists have developed sound
theories of recoupment that were not presented to or passed upon by the Court.90
For example, a ﬁrm might develop a reputation for predation by its conduct in
one or multiple markets, and thereby deter entry into and preserve monopoly
proﬁts in other markets.91 In that case, a predator could recoup its investment in
below-cost prices even if supracompetitive pricing in the market in which the
predation occurred did not suffice to recover the investment. A second recoupment strategy is to exploit imperfections in capital markets to deny ﬁnancing to
the rival.92
The relevance of modern recoupment theories was recognized in United
States v. AMR Corp., which considered alleged predation by American Airlines at
its Dallas-Fort Worth hub.93 In response to low-price competition from various
LCCs on four city-pairs, American dropped its fares to match prices and increased capacity by adding ﬂights and switching to larger planes.94 The Department of Justice (DOJ) sued, alleging that this conduct improperly induced the

89.

90.
91.

92.

93.
94.

See generally C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013) (exploring the potential for parallel exclusion schemes to be effective without provable agreement
among the excluders).
Nor would all of these theories have been a good ﬁt for the facts of the case as presented to
the Court.
See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 64, at 2299-2310 (describing the theory of reputation-based recoupment and supportive evidence drawn from the early history of local telephone competition).
See id. at 2285-99 (presenting the theory of ﬁnancial market predation and describing evidence). Yet another strategy is to mislead competitors into thinking that market demand is
low or that the incumbent’s own cost is low, in order to bluff the would-be entrant into staying
out of the market. See id. at 2311-21 (discussing the cost and demand signaling strategies). For
reviews of feasible recoupment strategies, see Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation,
Monopolization and Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); and Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and
Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1720-39 (2013).
335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1112.
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exit of the LCCs, after which American raised its prices and reduced the frequency of its ﬂights. DOJ alleged that recoupment was accomplished in part by
building a reputation for predation and thus deterring entry in both these routes
and others.95 The district court granted summary judgment to American, concluding that neither test of the Brooke Group framework had been satisﬁed.96 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground (discussed below) that DOJ had not established below-cost pricing and thus did not reach the analysis of recoupment.97
Even though the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judgment for the defendants, the
court also recognized that modern theories of recoupment can provide a logical
basis for sidestepping the skepticism of Brooke Group. It noted academic work
concluding “that price predation is not only plausible, but proﬁtable, especially
in a multi-market context where predation can occur in one market and recoupment can occur rapidly in other markets.”98 The court concluded: “Although this
court approaches the matter with caution, we do not do so with the incredulity
that once prevailed.” 99 This open-minded approach is supported both by the
evolution in economic thinking and by the need for different theories to describe
facts quite different from those considered in Brooke Group.100
C. Appropriate Measures of Cost and Revenue
In making the price-cost comparison, Brooke Group also invites a ﬂexible approach to the measurement of cost. Under the particular approach to predation
that justiﬁes use of a price-cost test, marginal cost—the cost of producing an

95.
96.
97.
98.

99.

100.

Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1120-21.
Id. at 1115 (citing Baker, supra note 11, at 590); see also id. at 1114-15 (citing Bolton, Brodley &
Riordan, supra note 64, at 2241, and quoting its statement that “[m]odern economic analysis
has developed coherent theories of predation that contravene earlier economic writing claiming that predatory pricing conduct is irrational”).
Id. at 1115; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David Mills, Predatory Pricing, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 40, 53 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol
eds., 2015) (“The Brooke Group formula does not prevent a plaintiff from demonstrating that
a defendant’s conduct ﬁts the mold of a reputation-based predatory pricing theory . . . .”).
In Spirit Airlines, plaintiffs apparently did not make a reputation argument. Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry: Spirit Airlines v. Northwest
Airlines (2005), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 307,
312-13, 329 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014). Nevertheless, the
Sixth Circuit appeared to recognize such a theory in the course of discussing market deﬁnition
and barriers to entry. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, 431 F.3d 917, 936 n.5, 947 (6th
Cir. 2005).
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additional unit of output—is the theoretically correct measure of cost. However,
marginal cost is difficult to measure, so parties and courts resort to proxies. The
Court did not insist on a particular proxy for marginal cost, but instead left to
lower courts the determination of an “appropriate” measure of cost. The Court
mentioned, presumably as acceptable alternatives, both average variable cost
(AVC) and incremental cost.101 The latter measure—the “avoidable” cost on the
relevant increment of production—can often exceed AVC.102 With higher cost
measures, aggressive price cutting is more likely to result in prices judged to be
below cost.
Where good incremental cost measures are available, courts can evaluate
them. AMR acknowledged this ﬂexibility, rejecting “[s]ole reliance” on routewide AVC because doing so “may obscure the nature of a particular predatory
scheme.”103 The Tenth Circuit considered several price-cost tests offered by DOJ
that employed incremental or avoidable cost, though the court ultimately found
ﬂaws in all of them. DOJ made the most headway with a test labeled “Test Four,”
which compared price to the average avoidable cost of the extra capacity—that
is, the costs that American would have avoided if it had not added extra capacity
to the route at issue.104 The Tenth Circuit ultimately rejected Test Four on the
narrow ground that the cost measure included some costs that were in fact unavoidable, such as airport ticket agents.105
The Tenth Circuit’s rejection of Test Four exempliﬁes the pull of Brooke
Group towards more restrictive approaches to predatory pricing. In our view,
Test Four was a sensible approach to evaluating American’s capacity expansion
and illustrates more broadly how incremental cost measures can be used when
evaluating a particular decision.

101.

102.

103.
104.
105.

See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 n.1 (1993) (noting
the parties’ agreement that AVC applies); id. at 223 (quoting the reference to incremental cost
in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117-18 n.12 (1986)); id. at 256 n.16
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
If the incremental cost is upward sloping, it exceeds AVC at high volumes. An upward sloping
incremental cost is plausible for airlines because, with added capacity, load factors fall, and
hence the per-passenger cost is higher. See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American
Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy (2001), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION:
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 502, 515-16 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White,
eds., 4th ed. 2004).
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1116; see also id. (“[T]here may be times when courts need the ﬂexibility
to examine both AVC as well as other proxies . . . .”).
Reply Brief for Appellant at 12, AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (No. 01–3202).
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1119-20 (criticizing inclusion of “variable, non-proportional common
costs . . . [including] (1) airport ticket agents, (2) arrival agents, (3) ramp workers, and (4)
security”).
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Measuring avoidable cost, however, often raises tricky technical issues. For
example, in the context of capacity increases in the airline sector, an important
component of avoidable cost is the cost of aircraft ownership. If an airline leases
another plane in order to add capacity, the avoidable nature of this cost is obvious. If it instead adds capacity by redeploying the aircraft from another route, it
incurs the opportunity cost of lost net revenues on that route.106 Absent good
evidence of the full opportunity cost, measuring the cost of ownership, such as
leasing rates, is a suitable proxy.107 In AMR, Test Four included the cost of aircraft ownership;108 the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether including this cost
was permissible.109 In Spirit Airlines, the Sixth Circuit accepted the inclusion of
a market-based lease rate.110
Brooke Group also offers some ﬂexibility in evaluating revenue. A central
question is to what extent a plaintiff is permitted to compare incremental revenue,
rather than price, with cost. Using incremental revenue in response to a price cut
or capacity expansion provides a revenue ﬁgure that is generally less than that
implied by price—so using incremental revenue, rather than price, makes it more
likely that the arrangement will be found to ﬂunk the price-cost test. An increase
in airline capacity may fail to yield much incremental revenue for two reasons.
The ﬁrst reason is passenger diversion. If the new plane is completely full,
but with passengers that otherwise would take an existing ﬂight, there is no incremental revenue. Test Four took this effect into account. It did not simply look
at the passengers that happened to sit on the new ﬂight; it included only revenue
attributable to those incremental passengers who would not have ﬂown on

106.
107.
108.
109.

110.

This assumes the extra plane has a productive alternative use, as opposed to sitting idle in the
desert due to an overinvestment in capacity.
Had there been no redeployment, American can be presumed to have earned at least enough
to cover its aircraft cost, or else it would have sold or leased the aircraft to others.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118 & n.12 (describing VAUDNC-AC).
The district court had rejected its inclusion on the incorrect ground that, for other purposes,
aircraft ownership is considered a ﬁxed cost. See id. (noting that aircraft ownership is “traditionally considered a ﬁxed cost in the airline industry”). Compare Gregory J. Werden, The
American Airlines Decision: Not with a Bang but a Whimper, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 32, 34
(suggesting that the Tenth Circuit likely viewed whether to include aircraft ownership as a
disputed fact), with Aaron Edlin, Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 144, 162 & n.65 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (concluding that the Tenth
Circuit rejected its inclusion).
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 940 (6th Cir. 2005) (accepting a
measure of costs, characterized as AVC, that included the “cost of the additional aircraft . . . that represented the incremental capacity in Northwest’s response to Spirit’s presence”) (citation omitted).
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American on that route but for the capacity increase.111 AMR accepted this approach, disagreeing with the district court’s critique that Test Four amounted to
a short-run proﬁt maximization test.
Price erosion provides a second reason for low incremental revenues: reduced revenue from inframarginal units that the defendant otherwise would
have sold at a higher price. DOJ offered a second test, labeled “Test One,” that
took this effect into account. AMR illustrated the point with an example:
[I]f an airline earned $20.6 million on a route that cost $18 million to
operate, it would have $2.6 million in proﬁt. If the airline then added a
ﬂight to the route that would cost $500,000 to operate, but brought in
an additional $1 million in revenue from passengers, the airline would
make $500,000 proﬁt. If adding this extra capacity to the route reduced
the proﬁtability of other ﬂights on that route, reducing revenue for the
rest of the route by $600,000 down to $20 million, under Test One, this
conduct would be considered predatory because rather than comparing
the additional ﬂight’s $1 million in revenue to its $500,000 in costs, Test
One looks only to the reduction in proﬁts on the route as a whole from
$2.6 million to $2.5 million. Thus, this conduct would be labeled predatory because the proﬁts for the route as a whole declined, even though
the capacity additions themselves were proﬁtable and the route as a
whole was still proﬁtable.112
In contrast to Test One, such conduct would be permitted under Test Four.113
111.

See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 102, at 515-16 (showing, in a hypothetical example with diversion but no price erosion, that both Test One and Test Four condemn the capacity expansion);
Werden, supra note 109, at 36 n.35 (distinguishing the tests on the basis that Test One took
account of price erosion).
112. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118 n.13 (citing Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive
Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for Deﬁning Costs and Market Power, 112
YALE L.J. 681, 694 (2003)). Puzzlingly, the court incorrectly stated that “as long as a ﬁrm’s
prices exceed its marginal cost, each additional sale decreases losses or increases proﬁts.” Id. at
1116 (citation omitted). This statement misses the reduced revenue on inframarginal units.
113. The capacity increase would be condemned under Test Four if the lost revenue was due to
diversion rather than price erosion. In terms of the hypothetical, suppose that the new ﬂight
has $1 million in revenue, of which $600,000 came from passengers diverted from other
ﬂights, which is the source of the $600,000 revenue reduction on the other ﬂights. Then it
would be condemned under Test Four: the $400,000 in incremental revenue attributable to
the capacity increase is less than its $500,000 cost.
This example raises the question of whether AMR might have intended its hypothetical,
and the associated critique, to apply to passenger diversion (in addition to proﬁt erosion). We
think not, for two reasons. First, if AMR rejected taking passenger diversion into account, it
would have rejected Test Four on this ground, which it did not do. Second, the court cited and
based its illustration on a discussion from an article by Einer Elhauge that appears to address
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The AMR court’s assertion that the “capacity additions themselves were profitable” begs the question of how one measures proﬁt. When revenues on a new
ﬂight exceed the costs of that ﬂight alone, the ﬂight could in some sense be said
to be proﬁtable. But if the addition of a new ﬂight reduces both revenue on other
ﬂights on the same route and proﬁts on the route as a whole, the decision to add
the new ﬂight can hardly be called proﬁtable. Nor can the addition of the new
ﬂight be said to be an efficient use of the ﬁrm’s assets. It can be said, however, to
reﬂect a sacriﬁce of proﬁts, presumably for some strategic purpose.114
The AMR court rejected Test One as a “short-run proﬁt-maximization”
test.115 DOJ did not argue that any failure to maximize proﬁts—such as by charging a lower price than the airline otherwise would—is actionable, and such an
argument would seem to be foreclosed by Brooke Group. DOJ argued instead that
a particular business strategy—which entailed an increase in capacity, a measurable reduction in proﬁts, and a subsequent reversal after the rival had exited the
market—should be regarded as predatory. DOJ presented good internal data and
extrinsic evidence showing that American’s conduct was far from proﬁt-maximizing by American’s own reckoning.116 The speciﬁc facts available in the case thus
reduced the likelihood of false condemnation.117
The court’s rejection of Test One reﬂects literal ﬁdelity to Brooke Group,
which refers to “price” rather than incremental revenue. However, Test One
might be squared with the Brooke Group framework by exploiting the Court’s
comparative ﬂexibility in the measurement of cost. As an economic matter, the
cannibalized revenues taken into account by Test One could be treated as another

114.
115.
116.
117.

only price erosion, not passenger diversion. See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To
Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for Deﬁning Costs and Market Power,
112 YALE L.J. 681, 694 (2003) (introducing an illustration of Test One by noting that it “necessarily takes into account the fact that adding the incremental capacity lowered prices (and
thus proﬁts) on the nonincremental ﬂights” (emphasis omitted)).
In other areas of exclusionary conduct, a sacriﬁce approach yields a relatively narrow scope of
liability, but here, the opposite is true.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118.
See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant at 6, AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (No. 01–3202) (“American
added three seats for every additional local passenger it carried.”).
If a ﬁrm’s internal documents about the proﬁtability of its conduct indicate a sacriﬁce of proﬁts
(but for the opportunity to exclude a rival), we can be conﬁdent of the ﬁrm’s intent to exclude,
which is in turn evidence of effect. Moreover, false negatives are less likely—and recoupment
more likely—where industry structure and history indicate the ability to repel new entrants
by, among other things, establishing a reputation for predation.
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opportunity cost. 118 Nevertheless, AMR rejected this approach, noting accurately that “Test One effectively treats forgone or ‘sacriﬁced’ proﬁts as costs.”119
Presumably, the AMR court saw deducting diverted revenues on the route as
departing from Brooke Group’s insistence on a price-cost comparison.
The Sixth Circuit in Spirit Airlines sought to escape the price-cost test altogether. It suggested that predation through capacity additions might not be governed by Brooke Group, and, hence, above-cost pricing can be challenged as unlawful monopolization. 120 The court apparently thought that avoiding Brooke
Group might be necessary to accommodate a comparison of incremental revenue
and incremental cost from a capacity addition. We are skeptical that this approach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. After all, adding capacity
directly translates into changes in price and cost, and thus would appear to be
within the Brooke Group framework. Unless and until the Supreme Court revisits
Brooke Group, we expect courts will insist upon some sort of price-cost comparison.
***
In short, AMR and Spirit Airlines are fairly read as efforts to adapt the Brooke
Group framework to the reality of modern predation cases. This is not to say the
analyses are perfectly clear. Both courts struggled with highly complex facts, and
the opinions are muddled in important respects.121 But, taken together, the cases
reveal a willingness to evaluate recoupment realistically—rather than skeptically—and to make use of incremental cost measures instead of AVC, where
available. As such, we are not ready to wave the white ﬂag and say that no predatory pricing cases can prevail under Brooke Group; rather, we would counsel enforcers and parties to be creative about how to develop such cases and argue for
ﬂexibility within Brooke Group. Going forward, we believe that parties can litigate successful predatory pricing cases under the Brooke Group framework—for
example, by identifying instances of monopoly recoupment or the development
of a reputation for predation.

118.

See Edlin, supra note 109, at 158 (proposing an “inclusive” cost measure along these lines).
Alternatively, one could formulate an inclusive deﬁnition of price that included the lost revenue from a reduced price on inframarginal units.
119. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118.
120. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951-53 (6th Cir. 2005).
121. See supra notes 106-109, 111-113, and accompanying text (discussing uncertainties in AMR’s
approach to aircraft costs and passenger diversion).

2073

the yale law journal

127:2048

2018

iii. an unwarranted extension: loyalty discounts
Brooke Group’s inﬂuence has extended beyond cases of simple price cutting.
Its conclusory assertion that predatory pricing is rarely tried and even more
rarely successful has been taken by some to mean that any conduct involving a
proﬁt sacriﬁce in order to exclude a rival is rare. Its conceptually simple idea of a
price-cost test has proven attractive to those seeking to make the law of anticompetitive exclusion tractable and predictable. The Supreme Court itself has since
repeated the assertion and extended the price-cost test to claims of monopsony
overbidding122 and price squeezes, stating broadly in the latter case that “low
prices are only actionable under the Sherman Act when the prices are below cost
and there is a dangerous probability that the predator will be able to recoup the
proﬁts it loses from the low prices.”123
We are concerned that the sometimes overly broad language in these cases
and the more general inﬂuence of Brooke Group create a risk that Brooke Group’s
framework will be applied to more complex pricing strategies for which it is unsuited. One such strategy is a “loyalty” discount, in which a seller offers its customers discounts on a single product or product line. In contrast to a quantity or
volume discounts, which are based upon the quantity that the customer buys
from the seller, loyalty discounts are based on the customer purchasing at least a
speciﬁed percentage—or “share” of its total purchases—of a particular type of
product from the seller, rather than its competitors. Loyalty discounts often take
the form of so-called “ﬁrst-dollar” discounts, where the customer receives a price
reduction on all units purchased if it meets the speciﬁed share requirement.
A full analysis of loyalty discounts is beyond the scope of this Feature. Here,
we simply argue that Brooke Group’s price-cost test is the wrong tool for evaluating this conduct. Determining whether Brooke Group ought to apply to loyalty
discounts is an urgent task, not only because loyalty discounts are common, but
also because several cases appear already to have taken that step. In Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways,124 for example, the Second Circuit rejected Virgin’s
challenge to loyalty discounts offered by British Airways to travel agents, because
Virgin had not proven that the discounts drove British Airways’ ticket prices below cost. In Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Co.,125 the Eighth Circuit overturned
a judgment for plaintiffs that had complained about Brunswick Corporation’s
loyalty and quantity discounts, because the court found, among other grounds,
that the discounted prices were above Brunswick’s costs. By contrast, the Third
122.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 457 (2009).
124. 257 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2001).
125. 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2000).
123.
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Circuit has eschewed any reliance on the price-cost test in this context. 126 In
short, the law in this area is unsettled and would beneﬁt from an appreciation of
the limits of Brooke Group.
Like all discounts, loyalty discounts can be a form of output-enhancing price
competition, and can mitigate the consequences of unanticipated market conditions when the buyer is not the ultimate consumer. For example, a share-based
discount enables a manufacturer to bear some of the risk that would otherwise
be borne by its distributor, which might not be able to reach quantity targets
needed for a discount in times of unexpectedly low demand. Conversely, a sharebased discount ensures that the distributor will continue to be motivated to promote the manufacturer’s product, even if unexpectedly strong demand would
render a quantity-based threshold trivial.
One possible application of Brooke Group would apply the discount to all
units sold, and check whether the average net price is higher than some measure
of cost. That approach has the virtue of simplicity, but it fails to reﬂect the particular risk to competition sometimes posed by loyalty discounts. In many cases,
some level of a dominant ﬁrm’s sales will be “noncontestable” in the sense that
rivals cannot as a practical matter compete for them, perhaps because of capacity
constraints or customer brand preferences. In these cases, the discount is offered
only to win contested sales.
Thus, a more faithful adaptation of the price-cost test is to allocate the entire
discount to the contested sales.127 After all, the competitor would have to match,
by lowering its price on the contested sales, the entire discount offered by the
defendant on both contestable and noncontestable sales. Consequently, if the

126.

In ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit found unlawful loyalty discounts that were combined with other forms of exclusionary conduct. The court
relied on evidence that failure to meet the loyalty targets “would jeopardize [plaintiffs’] relationships with the dominant manufacturer of transmissions in the market,” id. at 278, which
the court said made the loyalty targets in effect mandatory purchase requirements that should
be evaluated as “de facto partial exclusive dealing arrangements,” id. at 282. See also Eisai, Inc.
v. Sanoﬁ Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 409 (3d Cir. 2016) (ruling for the defendant on
other grounds and declining to decide “when, if ever, the price-cost test applies to” “a discount
that bundled incontestable and contestable demand”).
127. This approach is in essence a discount attribution test, see Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth,
515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008), applied to a loyalty discount instead of bundling. See Competitive
Impact Statement at 14-15, United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-cv-00030
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011) (taking this approach and noting the analogy to Cascade Health); 12
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 749e (3d ed. 2012);
Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH
L. REV. 863, 878-80 (assessing and criticizing this approach). In Europe, it is known as the
“as efficient competitor” test. See, e.g., Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n (Sept. 6, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-413/14 [http://perma.cc/EN3Y-QVYR].
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goal is to determine whether an equally efficient competitor can match the discount, the relevant discount should be entirely allocated to the contested sales.
However, allocating the discount by removing noncontestable sales gives rise
to several practical problems. These include, among others, how to determine
the amount of sales that are contested, how to determine the incremental costs
associated with just the contestable sales, and how to determine the size of the
discount (which might be especially difficult if the seller does not specify a discount but rather says, “if you buy X%, the price will be $Y”).
The last problem suggests a more fundamental reason why a price-cost test
might be unsuited to loyalty discounts. The test, as applied to predatory pricing
claims, is explicitly intended to avoid false positives and promote aggressive,
procompetitive price competition, even at the cost of false negatives. That caution reﬂects the intuition that a simple price cut beneﬁts consumers.128 The welfare beneﬁt of a loyalty discount is much less clear. For one thing, a loyalty discount might not entail an actual discount from the prices that would otherwise
be charged. The commercial success of a loyalty discount depends largely on the
relationship between the discounted price and the undiscounted price, so in
some situations, the arrangement might entail an artiﬁcially inﬂated undiscounted price intended to serve as a coercive lever to induce more sales at the
nominally discounted price. A seller might be able to dispel the suspicion of such
an arrangement if there are a substantial number of sales under comparable circumstances at the undiscounted price. However, absent such benchmarks, it
might be difficult to determine what portion, if any, of the nominal discount
reﬂects an actual discount from the price that would otherwise be charged.
Moreover, while a simple price cut expands output in the short run, a loyalty
discount might have the opposite effect if it deters a customer from making incremental purchases from rivals that would not displace purchases from the
dominant seller. Such incremental purchases from the rival would increase overall market output but push the percentage purchases from the dominant seller
below the threshold required for the discount. And even where loyalty discounts
reduce average prices, they might result in price discrimination among customers depending on what portion of their purchases are noncontestable, and some
customers might wind up paying higher prices than they would in the absence
of the loyalty discount.
The upshot is that a facile application of the Brooke Group test to loyalty discounts would be mistaken, even though loyalty discounts involve prices and
“discounts,” and can thus seem similar to simple price cuts in a semantic sense.
128.

Reality is more complex. Even an above-cost price cut, though it beneﬁts productive efficiency, may harm consumers (and total welfare) by excluding competitors whose presence
would keep down prices. See Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1199 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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In devising an appropriate test, two factors seem particularly important. Identifying the harm from discounting depends on knowing, ﬁrst, whether the loyalty
discount diminishes the rival’s ability to compete for other sales, and second,
whether negative contracting externalities undercut a customer’s ability to refuse
offers that would harm competition to its detriment.129 To answer these questions, a price-cost comparison provides no help.
conclusion
The Brooke Group framework, as interpreted by cases such as AMR and Spirit
Airways, leaves courts free to conduct an empirically grounded evaluation of the
likelihood of recoupment under the circumstances of each individual case. Under
this approach, a court is free to consider the plausibility of recoupment, without
reference to Brooke Group’s skeptical dicta, where monopoly or a well-coordinated oligopoly is concerned. Moreover, modern theories of recoupment, such
as the development of a reputation for predation, should be brought to bear
when evaluating whether recoupment is likely. Courts can also use the presence
of below-cost pricing as a basis for inferring recoupment, so long as it is not the
sole basis for the inference.
Brooke Group also permits ﬂexibility in making price-cost comparisons. A
measure of incremental cost can be used instead of AVC where good information
is available. The analysis may also account for incremental revenue, though not
to the extent of including in-market inframarginal revenue sacriﬁce due to a low
price.
Finally, there is nothing special about Brooke Group that suggests that its
price-cost test should be extended to more complex pricing strategies like loyalty
discounts. Indeed, the underlying concern with costly false positives which motivates the test is largely absent, and the practical problems seem insuperable.
Sound policy analysis counsels against applying the Brooke Group principles to
such cases.

129.

See B. Douglas Bernheim & Randal Heeb, A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary
Conduct, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 3 (Roger D.
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
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